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Because  of concern with credit risk and information  problems,  lenders ration mortgage
credit.  They do this mainly  in two ways: first, they limit  access to credit only to those able to
afford to make  significant  down payments;  and second, they  limit eligibility for loans to those
able to pay less than  a specific  share of their income for repayments. I  This rationing may make
mortgage  lending  more prudent,  but at the same time it also reduces  the welfare of those who are
rationed  out of the market by non-price  means.  For instance,  Schmidt-Mohr  (1997) argue that
lenders'  reliance  on high down payment  lending  can be a very costly as well as regressive  way to
solve the informational  problems  associated with such loans.
Reliance on rationing  to determine  loan eligibility  arises because  of lenders'  reluctance to
lend against borrowers'  future income, or, alternatively,  borrowers'  inability to pledge their
human  capital. It also arises because mortgage  credit risk is largely driven by the behavior  of
house prices so that the risk is geographically  concentrated.  As a result, lenders, and particularly
those lenders with geographically  concentrated  mortgage  portfolios,  in effect, purchase prudence
by allowing  only those with accumulated  savings  access to credit. 2
Such rationing  characterizes  mortgage  lending  in most countries.  Indeed, outside of the
five transition  countries that we examine down payments of 40 percent  or more of initial house
value  is the situation in most transition  economies.  A similar if not as extreme situation  also
characterizes  lending  in many OECD countries,  and it has generated  a variety of subsidy and
insurance schemes to help  address the costs posed by this rationing,  particularly  for first-time
homebuyers.3
In general two types of public policy  solutions  that have been  developed.  One is to
provide  subsidies  for households  so that they are able to save enough in a second mortgage  to
"top up" the low loan-to-value  ratio loan they can get from banks. The other is the provision  of
default insurance  whereby  borrowers  pay an insurance fee to be able to borrow  loans with larger
loan to value ratios.4  One of the questions  we address is: how do these  approaches compare  as
1 The first type of constraint  rations  those households  without  savings from homeownership.  The second rations  out
those households  who have enough  savings  for the down payment  but cannot  satisfy the payment-to-income
constraints  lenders  use to quality borrowers.  An extensive  literature  indicates  that in the U.S. and U.K. the first
constraint  is more  binding.  It is also the case that  lenders ration based  on borrower  credit history,  which in the U.S.
is increasingly  important.
2  The potential  macroeconomic  consequences  of such rationing  have also long been  a subject  of discussion.  For
instance,  in his Nobel Lecture  Akerlof  (2002)  discusses  credit rationing  as one of the information  problems  that can
have  significant  macroeconomic  consequences.
3  Hendershott  and White (2000)  discuss various  tax subsidy schemes  used in Australia,  Canada, Germany,  Sweden,
Ireland  and the U.S.  Other public  programs  are operative  in the UK, France,  Norway,  Finland  and Denmnark. These
latter programs  are discussed  in Tumer,  Whitehead  and Jakobbson  (2000).
4The  most  frequently  used homeownership  subsidy  scheme  to subsidize  second  mortgages  is the Bausparkassen
savings  scheme used  in Germany,  Austria,  and France.  This scheme takes  a number  of forms but  generally  first
provides  subsidies  to young  families  to save for a number  of years, and then provides  them with a subsidized  loan to
top up their mortgage  loan. This subsidized  loan is for a multiple  of the amount saved.  The objective  is to use
subsidies  to encourage  savings for larger down payments  so there is less need for  a second loan,  and then to
subsidize  the higher  costs of the second loans.  Besides  default insurance  and subsidies  as ways to address rationing
another  approach  to address  the rationing  problem  has been proposed  by Case,  Shiller, and Weiss  (1993).  It2
ways to address the non-price  rationing  that charactei.izes mortgage lending?  For transition
countries this question has some currency because  six of them  naave  recently  adopted the subsidy
approach while five have  opted for public provision  of default  insurance.5 In addition, both
approaches  are now under  consideration  in olher couatries,  such as Russia, Mexico,  and India.
In the five transition economies  we review -Estonia,  Kazakhstan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and
Slovenia-the  public  sector plays a major  role in insuring mortgage  default,  as it does in almost
all the OECD countries where  it operates.6 Hence, di3rect  public  sector bearing  of mortgage
credit risk is a wide-spread  phenomenon  in both market  and newly-emerging  transition
countries.  Accordingly,  a second topic  addressed here is how to measure  and monitor  the public
role in the provision  of this service.
We address  this latter topic  at some length because  while public provision  of insurance
can help  complete markets  and lower  credit costs, it can also eritail major risks or implicit
transfers  if the institutions  do not manage  and price iisk properly.  The factors  that determine
which  result is obtained  are: the reserves  held  and mortgage  insurance  fees charged,  and the
riskiness  of the environment.  That is, does the company have sufficient  capital and charge prices
for the guarantee  such that the government  risk-bearing  is fully compensated?  8 Moreover,  if the
government  risk-bearing  is not fully compensated  how does the government  account  for the
guarantee  in its budget  so that public  risks  are controlled,  and any service provided  at a price  less
than cost is treated as a subsidy?
In addition to its fiscal  effects, insurance program  structures  can also be important
because  of the indirect effects they can have on a country's  firnancial sector development.9 For
involves  establishing  an index-based  futures  mnarket  and option;  for house prices.  This approach  has recently  been
developed  in London,  see lacoviello  and Ortalo-Mague  (2002).
5Bausparkassen  subsidy schemes  have been introduced  in Croatia,  the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  Hungary,
Poland,  and Slovenia.  Public default  insurance  operates  in Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania,  and Slovenia.  In Kazakhstan
the public  sector has capitalized  a company  that  will begin operating  soon,  see Merrill  and Whitely  (2002).
6 OECD  countries  with publicly-sponsored  default  insurance  include  Belgiumn, Canada,  Sweden,  the Netherlands,
Finland,  France,  the U.S. and the U.K.  The U.S., U.K.,  Israel,  and Canada  also have private  insurers.  In addition,  as
of September  2002,  Spain, like Australia,  has only a private  default insurer.  There  are also often public  limitations
on the provision  of private  default  insurance.  In the U.S., for instance,  private  insurers  were prohibited  until  1956
following  the bankruptcy  of the industry  during the CGreat  Depression.  The strong performance  of the public  nsurer,
FHA,  led to their re-establishment.  See Blood  (2002)  for a fuller  discussion  of the termns  under  which  default
insurance  is provided  in OECD  countries,  and the European  Mortgage  Fecderation (1989) for a somewhat  dated
discussion  of many of the details  of mortgage-related  insurance  in a number  of European  countries.
7  Even where there is no direct  public  role in bearing; credit risks,  as in Germany,  there is often  a significant  indirect
public role.  For example,  where  large loan-to-value  rmortgage loans are made  without  a direct guarantee,  as is often
the case in Germnany, there is still  frequently  a significant  public  role in mortgage  credit  risk bearing  due either to the
public  ownership  of the banks providing  the loans, the regulations  on higber risk-weighting  for high loan-to-value
mortgages,  or the guarantees  provided  to banks  by the German  Development  Bank,  KfW. See Schuder  (2002)  for a
discussion  of the last approach.
8 This is the approach  to regulation  of Fannie  Mae and Freddie  Mac, the two large U.S. secondary  market
institutions,  by their regulator,  the Office of Federal  Housing  Enterprise  Oversight,  OFHEO.  See the OFHEO
Report to Congress (2001).
9 Government  involvement  in mortgage  markets  can be an imnportant impediment  to financial  sector  developrnent
because  of the scale of public  support  and the fact that this support  is often provided  in non-transparent  ways,  see
Maclennan,  Muelbaurer,  and Stephens  (1998)  for a discussion  of mortgage  credit policies  in market  economies,  and
Struyk (2000)  for a discussion  of transition  countries.3
example,  is it the case that an ongoing public role in the industry is warranted-as  some have
argued based  on the failure of private insurers  in the U.S. and Canada  during the Great
Depression-because  the risk is uninsurable?10
Similarly,  in the case of the EU countries, how do national mortgage  policies  affect
lenders'  ability to exploit the geographic  diversification  possibilities  that can arise now that there
is one large  single currency market?  For instance,  do various  individual  country guarantees
create competitive  distortions  in the broader  EU market  as has been  suggested by  the European
Banking Federation?"
Finally,  due to the smaller  geographical  size of the transition  countries that have  adopted
the insurance  approach, there may be gains that can be obtained  from shedding  some portion  of
this risk across larger geographical  areas. 1 2 How can these  smaller markets create a regulatory
environment  that is both prudent  and welcoming  of more risk-bearing  by more geographically
diversified  institutions?  More generally,  given the very recent  and often piecemeal  emergence  of
de novo  financial sectors in all of the transition  countries it is important  to achieve a better
understanding  of how small  economies'  macroeconomic  risks  can be most effectively  allocated,
monitored,  and controlled.
In sum, a better understanding  of the scale of public  sector involvement  and government
regulation  of mortgage  credit risk allocation  should be of immediate  interest to policy-makers  in
both the transition  economies  as well as those of the European  Union. In both cases a better
understanding  of the public  role in mortgage  credit risk allocation  would help establish  a level
playing  field across institutions,  as well  as a regulatory  environment  which would  allow lenders
to allocate risks to those with  a comparative  advantage  in such risk-bearing.
10  Among  others, see Foster  and Herzog  (1981),  Pennington-Cross  and Yezer  (2000),  and, according  to the
European  Mortgage  Federation  (1988),  it is the view  of Gernan  credit institutions.
1  In 1999 the Federation  lodged  a formal cornplaint  with the European  Commission  against the system of public
guarantees  for Landesbanken  and savings  banks in Germany.
12 Macro  shocks  can have significant  effects on financial  sector stability  and public  contingent  liabilities.  For
example,  as shown by Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996),  in the past fifteen  years the banking  sectors of more than 58
countries became  technically  insolvent  often with large public costs.  Mortgage  credit  risk is a particularly  important
aspect of risk  distribution  in geographically  small  countries because  in such countries  there are not as mnany  distinct
housing  markets  so that these  risks cannot as easily be hedged  across  markets.  For example,  as discussed  further  in
the text,  Quigley  and Van Order (1991),  show that  variations  in regional  mortgage  default rates in the U.S. are both
considerable--they  vary by a factor  of five across regions--and  are negatively  correlated,  indicating  strong
geographical  diversification  possibilities4
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the nexl: section we discuss how  a version  of
Merton's  (1973) options model pricing of deposit insurance  guarantees  can be applied to
mortgage  credit insurance  and mortgage  credit risk regulations.  Then, in section III we apply the
model to the terms and conditions  of 12 forms of insurance  now in use in 9 countries and discuss
the relative  risks of the various programs.  Section  IV considers  some of the complications  that
arise in exercising the underlying  options that affect th.e pricing of these institutional  guarantees.
It presents  empirical results  from the U.S. to cLemonstrate  how these complications  can affect
both the default behavior  of individuals  and the estimates  of the guarantee fees needed for
financial soundness.  Based  on these results,  inI section V, we review  a number of policy
questions.  A final section provides  a summary  and cornclusions
II.  Guarantees of Financial Institutions as Options.
Based on Merton's  application  of the  'Black-Scholes option pricing model,  a financial
institution  with asset value  V uses debt financing  in the form of a zero-coupon  bond  issue. At the
maturity  date of the bond,  T, the firm owes B dollars  to the bondholders,  and in the event of
default the firmn  must forfeit its assets.  We recognize  the implicit  option with the following
observation:  at maturity  T, if the value of the firm's  assets, V, is greater than the value of the
bond,  the firm will pay the bondholders  B and net  V-B; alternatively,  if the value of the firm's
assets is less than the value  of the bond,  the firm will default.  In this case, the bondholders  will
claim  V, and the firm's  equity will have zero  value.
If the firm purchases  a third-party  guarantee,  dlirectly anialogous to the deposit  insurance
modeled  by Merton, ensuring  that the value of the debt remains  constant  at B, we can use option-
pricing theory to value the guarantee.  If the value  of the firm is less than the face value of the
bond, the firm will act as before,  paying  boncdholders B and netting  V-B.  In this  case the
guarantee  has value zero.  However,  in the event of d.efault, the guarantor will pay the difference
between  the value of the debt  and firm equity  (B-  V) to the bondholder.  Thus, the guarantee  has
value min (0, B- V), a non-negative  value.  This valuation  of a bond  guarantee is identical  to that
of a put option with stock price  " r"  and exercise  pric;e "B" and absent the guarantee  it can be
thought of as the discount  on the firm's  zero-coupon  bonds due to credit risk.
From  the firm's  perspective  the debt guarantee  is a put option that gives it the right to sell
its assets "V'  at price  "B" at an exercise  date identical  to the maturity date of the bond.  The
value  of the option is governed  by the volatility  of the, value  of the firmn's  assets. Thus, the
traditional  Black-Scholes  pricing equation  can be used to evaluate  the implied  assumptions  about
how risky  the environment  is seen by the firm or the firm's  regulators,  i.e. what is implied
volatility  of the firm's  asset value.  This is given by
G(T) = Be-r-I,(x 2) - V(d(x1 1)
where:
2) xi -log(B/V)-(r+  2 )T  u-T  (1
X  2  - Xi +  T5
where  V is the current value of the assets of the firm, T the maturity date, a2 the variance rate per
unit of time for logarithmic  changes in the value of assets and  <)(x) the cumulative  normnal
distribution.' 3
The same concept can approximately  be applied to mortgage  guarantees  both on an
institutional  and individual  basis.  First consider the institutional  guarantee.
In the case of a publicly-owned  or sponsored mortgage  insurance  company, the
government  guarantees  availability  of additional  resources  to cover any shortage in the insurance
company's  capital.  In the case of a mortgage  insurance company it has liabilities  ("B") to
mortgage  lenders in the event  of a borrowers'  default and it has assets ("V") in the form of
capital. Because the capital is more or less fixed as a set ratio to the insurance in force, the
government,  as a guarantor of the insurance  company, is concerned with the volatility  of claims
from the mortgage  lenders to the insurance company.
Lenders'  claims, on the other hand, are determined  by the default  of the insured
borrowers.  The risk of this default, however  is determined  largely by the households  exercise of
their individual  default option. Hence,  in effect, the government  guarantee  is an option (the
insurance company's  put) on a borrower's  option (the homeowner's  put) and rigorous  evaluation
of the risks would require the pricing of an option on an option,  a quite complicated
mathematical  model.
But, the complications  are not only computational.  For example,  non-quantifiable
differences  in legal recourse  also matter in determining how ruthlessly  or even whether the
household  exercises its default  option. 4  In addition, borrowers  are also affected by the
constraints  on their ability to exercise  another  option embedded in the mortgage-the
prepayment  option, and these constraints  on the prepayment  option are quite different.  In some
countries,  such as Germany,  prepayment  is effectively  not an option, in most other countries is in
an option that can in some cases be explicitly purchased  while in others various  forms of this
option are embedded in the loan terms. Finally,  as we discuss further  in section IV, the
borrowers'  default option is also characterized  by  asymmetric information  in which individuals
know how much value they place on the indirect costs of exercising the option and the insurer
does not.15 In a word, then, it is not at all clear that such modeling  is worth the candle.
Nevertheless,  with a number  of simplifying  assumptions  we can make  direct  and conservative
estimates  of the value of the government's  guarantee  for specific economic  environments,  or
alternatively,  for given guarantee  terms, we can infer just  how volatile  an environment  is
assumed  by regulators.
13 This methodology  can be extended  to more  complicated  options,  for instance  options  that  extend over several
periods.  However,  for the purposes  of this paper use of only one period was found to be sufficient.  It is well known
that  the solution  to models,  such as equation  (1) have the intuitively  pleasing property  that the value of the option is
the risk-adjusted  expected present  value  of the costs of the option.  This result allows  for practical  solutions  to
complicated  options via simulation  techniques,  such as "Monte  Carlo"  models.
14 See Jones  (1993) for analysis  of the significant  effects that legal differences  with regard to recourse  in two
Canadian  provinces  have on default behavior.
15 See Jaffee  and Stiglitz (1990)  for a review  of this literature.6
Our first simplifying  assumption  is to ignore the cohort effects that can arise over time. In
other words,  for simplicity,  and following the approach taken  in Case and Shiller (1996), we
assume that the insurer's  portfolio  is represented  by an average loan-to-value  ratio for loans
which all have the same down payment,  were originated  at one point in time, have the same
amortization  schedules,  and whose prices move together.  This approach prohibits  the higher than
average eamings  (as well  as losses)  from pasi cohorts to fund rnew  insurance,  see Capone (2000)
for a discussion  of these effects. It could also affect the relative  rankings  in the table depending
upon both the volatility  of a country's  growth trend and the degree of international
diversification  of its financial system.  We nevertheless  made it because  of the computational
difficulties  in inferring how  much inter-temporal  and  international  diversification  a country
might have. We note, however,  that this assunption  wATill  tend to make  our estimates  more
conservative.
We also assume that the amount  of negative  equity realized  by firms when  a default
occurs differs  for firms providing  insurance  for 100 percent  of loan balance  and those providLing
first coverage  insurance  for less than the full loan amount.  For insurers  providing  less than  1.00
percent insurance,  i.c., those co-insuring  risks, we assume that the losses realized  will be equal to
the full amount  of the insurance in force, that is 20 to 30 percent  of the insured amount.  For
firms providing  100 percent  coverage  we assume that the loss will be about 50 percent of the
insurance  in force.  This assumption  is made  to take, into account  lenders being more  likely to
select against  an insurer,  and particularly  a public  one, which  provides  100 percent  coverage,  as
has been observed  in the U.S. by Pennington-Cross  and Yinger (2000).
Finally,  we assume that there  are no legal differences  with respect to loan recourse  in the
event of default  and the ability to prepaid  loans are identical  across countries.  With these
assumptions,  we can formalize  how the price charged  can affect  government  transfers.  In terms
of the Black-Scholes  formula, public  transfers  arise when the value of the mortgaged  housing
and the insurance  company's  capital is less than the value  of outstanding  loans. The probability
of exercising  this option by the insurance  cornpany  wvould  be almost non-existent  if it had
sufficient  equity, i.e. if capital and insurance  fees were such that the ex ante  price  of the
institutional  guarantee  is approximately  zero, 16 In  this case there  is no subsidy  since the
expected losses  are close  or equal to the insurance  company's  capital. In contrast,  a positive
option price  indicates the premium  that the governnment shoulcl charge the mortgage  insurance
company  for its backing.
The above also implies  that  the present value  of insurance  fee and capital ("G") for the
insurance  company  should equal the expected present  value  of losses. More  generally, because
of the expected present  value  interpretation  of the option pricing model  G must be such that:
IV  G  N  E(L  )
E  G  UPB  =  t  UPB,  (2)
where  UPBt is the unpaid balance  on the pool, r is the appropriate  risk-adjusted  discount rate, N
is the terrn of the mortgages  in the pool and E-(Ld is dhe expected loss per dollar  of UPB at time t.
16 It is straightforward  to show that,  given V, the value  of G in equation  (1) goes  to zero as B goes to zero.7
Under these  circumstances,  the government  backing  of the mortgage  insurance programn  would
involve  no direct costs to the government because  fees and capital would be sufficient to cover
the expected  losses.
III.  The Implied Risks  of the Mortgage  Insurance.
Using  the methodology  described  above, we use the specific terms of 12 mortgage
insurance programs  in 9 countries to estimate the assumed volatility  or riskiness  of each
program.  The results are presented in Table  1. Under this approach the government-either  as a
guarantor  or a cost-minimizing  regulator-sets  the regulations  so that the costs of risks are
covered  by the fees generated.
In our calculations we use an American  put option with a term of one year, although
changing  the terrn to 5 or 10 years does not affect the relative  rankings.  We also aggregated the
up-front  fee and the annual fee into an annual income measure,  and assume that these
"dividends,"  in their entirety, along with reserves,  would be used to pay off loan losses.  Finally,
because  we are focusing  on one specific instrument in each country  rather than a range of, for
example,  different down payment  requirements,  the likelihood  of the insurer realizing  losses is
most fundamentally  affected by the maximum  insurance-in-force  to capital ratio that is allowed.
The Table  1 presents  the results  and basic  characteristics  of the different programs.  In the
market  economies,  the loans discussed  are 30 year, 5 percent  down-payment  fully amortizing
mortgage  loans and in the Baltic countries and Kazakhstan  the loans are 15 year serial loans with
10 percent down payments.17
Columns  2 through 6 describe the programs'  basic terms. The penultimate  column  of the
table shows the results of solving equation  (1) for the implied  volatility.  The last column
presents  a relative  ranking  of the perceived  riskiness  of the policies with (1) being the safest, and
(12) being the riskiest. As can be seen from the table both capital requirements  and premiums
differ considerably  across the countries,  and correspondingly,  so do the implied volatilities.
Before  reviewing  our results, it is perhaps  useful to once again clarify some of the
caveats that limit the inferences  that can be drawn. It is, for example,  not possible  to control for
all the differences  in the terms of insured loans, legal and judicial  infrastructure.  In addition, the
estimates  of volatility  are for a portfolio  of loans rather than an individual  loan. The point  of the
exercise  is to give a relative  ranking.  Therefore, rather than trying to determine  whether  the
riskiness  of the program  is under- or over-estimated,  we use the results to pose questions:  For
example,  given  some perspective  on how risky is a country's  economic  environment,  how  safe
does a program  appear to be?
'7 While it is possible  to borrow  for maturities  of up to 30 years in all of the transition  countries in practice  most
loans are of much  shorter term.  See the annex  for a fuller  discussion  of the sources of information  and details  on the
program  structures.  We did not evaluate  a Slovenian  program  that  insures  loans provided  by a publicly-owned
insurer  for indexed  loans. There is some question  whether these  loans are legally  mortgages,  reducing  the underlying
collateral  strength  for the insurance.  See Buckley  and Gilbertson  (1999). However,  when these  features  are
combined  with the loans very slow amortization,  due to the indexed  repayments,  it is likely  that this is among  the
riskiest  of the programs.  Nor did we evaluate  a Finnish program  operating  since  1996 for reasons  described  in
footnote  18.8
Table  1.  Mortgage  Insurance Terms  and Implied  Risk.
Insurance  in  Premium  Premium  as  Claim  Maximum  Implied
force-to-capital  as an upfront  annual initerest  coverage  loan to value  volatility  Rank
ratio  fee  _  payment  ___  ratio
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Canada  57  3.75%  0%  100%  95%  2.3%  9
Estonia  10  3 -3.5%  0%  .24%  90%  4%  3
France  28  2%  0.15%  100%  100%/0>  3.4%  6
Kazakhstan  20  4%  0%  20%  85%  2.6%  8
Latvia  2  0%  1%  22%  90%  18.8%  1
Lithuania  12  7.78%  0%  100%  95%  5.8%  2
(old  program)
The  Netherlands  227  0.3%  0%  00%  1000/0>  1.4%  11
Sweden  co  0%  0.5%  30%  100'/0>  0%  12
(old stock)
Sweden  (new  62.5  0%  0.5%  30%  100%/a>  1.66%  10
stock
USA
Financial  33  0%  0.07%  100%  80%  3.1%  7
Institutions
USA
Private  Insurance  11.2  0%  0.5%  2C%-30%  95%  3.8%  4
USA
Public  Insurance,  25  1.5%  0.5%  100%  97%  3.5%  5 FHA  II  III_  _
(The implied  risk-free annual  interest rate used in the calculations  is 6 percent.  See description
of insurance  companies  and data sources  in Annex  1)
In particular,  how  do the program  terms in one country  compare  with those in other
countries?  Does it seem likely that a program  is providing  imp licit subsidies  or contingent
liabilities  for the government  and/or households?  And if it provides  subsidies,  are they
accounted  for in the budget?
It may also be appropriate  to consider  whether the rankings  in Table  1 are intuitively
plausible.  Perhaps the simplest  way to answer this question is to look at the pre-1997  Swedish
program  which  is ranked  as the riskiest  of all the programs  analyzed.  It is also the only program
analyzed that has realized  losses after operating  for more than  a decade.  Hence,  while risk
exposure  is also affected by factors  other than,  just  the regulations  governing  risk exposure,  e.g.,
the scale of the shocks experienced,  the poor performance  of Sweden  is at least consistent  with9
the results  of our analysis. 1 8 That is, all other things being equal, it would be the program that
the model would predict  to be the one with the highest probability  of losses. Given the apparent
strength of the Swedish insurer's  legal recourse we cannot  say how  these risks will ultimately  be
shared between  government  and households,  but based on past  experience,  it is clear that under
the current program  the government  is by no means insulated  from risk exposure.
Another perspective  on whether  the estimates  are plausible  is provided by comparing  the
implied volatilities  with experience.  The estimates for the U.S.  in column 7 suggest that with  a
standard deviation  of the average house price of approximately  3.5 percent the programs  would
be financially  sound, as independent  analyses of the soundness of FHA, by Capone  (2000) and of
private insurers,  cited in Capone, indicate  they are. Certainly,  the standard deviation  of
individual  house values in the U.S. has been considerably higher;  in fact, according to Case,
Shiller, and Weiss  (1993), it has been  closer to  10 percent, suggesting  that the estimated
volatility  is much too conservative.
However, recall that the volatility  estimate is for the entire portfolio,  and the U.S. has the
geographically  largest and most diverse mortgage  market. Consequently,  it would not be
surprising  if the portfolio's  standard deviation  was much lower.  In fact, data on U.S. house
prices collected  by Freddie  Mac, a U.S.  secondary market institution,  over the 1975 to 2001
period indicate  that the standard deviation  of the average national  house prices has been 3.3
percent.  Thus,  again, the estimates  are broadly consistent  with the empirical evidence.
Now consider the three riskiest  programs  depicted in the table, i.e., Sweden's  pre-1997
program,  its current one, and the Dutch program.  In the Swedish  cases the insurance in force is
backed by a 100 percent  government-owned  company so that even if the company  formally held
no capital the guarantees  would  still be a public obligation.
The Swedish regulators  did not see their pre-1997  program  as being  subsidized, although
it is doubtful  that they thought that the programn  was a sound financial  policy either, as the
program  ultimately realized  losses of over $700 million.19 Nevertheless,  in many ways what is
more important  than whether  regulators  got the prices right is whether  they were  at all prepared
for possibly  getting the prices wrong.  In the pre-1997 program  it appears that they were not.
Before  the losses were incurred,  the program was not budgeted  as a subsidy program.  Hence,
what appears as one of the riskiest programs,  as well  as one that incurred  significant  government
costs, was seen as neither  subsidy nor strictly as finance.
18 In some ways it is possible  to look at the pre-1977  Swedish program  as a switch  from a bauspar-like  subsidized
second mortgage  to an insured  larger first loan.  So, even with subsidies,  it may  still have been more  cost effective
than its predecessor  as a way to address mortgage  rationing.
19 Sweden's  losses in the 1990s are the result  of the interaction  of a number  of factors  besides  the program's
structure,  as detailed  in Hendershott  and Turner  (1994).  In the Swedish  case no capital was held.  The contrast  of the
Swedish  and Finnish  programs  is also interesting.  The Finnish  program  charges  an up-front  fee of 2.5 percent,  and
instead  of holding  reserves  against  insurance  in force,  places  an annual  figure in the budget  to cover losses.  No
losses have realized  beyond  fees collected  as of yet. Finland's  program  is not  evaluated  in the table  because  of the
variations  in the annually  budgeted  liability structure.  However,  the framework  developed  here  could be used to
evaluate the adequacy  of the budgeted  funds.10
Of more prospective  concern, however,  is what the rankings  in Table  1 suggest about the
Dutch  and the current,  restructured  Swedish programs.  The Table  indicates that they both have
much  lower prices and a relatively  risky reserve  structure, one which  could eventually  be costly
for either their governments  or those who have purchased  the insurance.  The former program
has operated  in its current form only since  1995 (see M\4ersmanri  (2001)),  and, as a result, has not
yet been  in operation durirng an economic  dovnturn.  Nevertheless,  it already has 40.9 billiorL
euros  of insurance  in force, an amount equal to 4.7 percent  of GDP.  Consequently,  given its
pricing  and capital structure,  it appears to represent  a significant  contingent  liability for either the
Dutch  government  or those insured. 2 0
For example, the model  indicates that for the iprograms in both countries to be operating
without  subsidy, they can tolerate a volatility  in house prices,  column  7, that is less than half of
that of the U.S. For such a result to be realized, however,  either the implied volatility  of asset
prices must indeed be less than half that of the more  geographically  diversified  U.S. market,
which  it is not, or the insurer must have greater recour-se to the borrower's  non-housing  assets
and income,  as they do in both  countries. 21 Thus, to the extent that stronger  insurer recourse
complicates  direct  comparisons  between  the lJ.S.  ancd  these countries  as to the likelihood  of
default, the difficulty  arises  largely because  th1e  insurers'  relatively  stronger  financial position  in
the European  countries  occurs by increasing borrowers'  risk exposure.  Thus, to the extent that
the Dutch  and Swedish insurers'  exposures  are not considerably  higher than is the case in the
U.S., it is so not because  of program design but rather because  households  are more  exposed.
themselves  to macroeconomic  shocks.  So, ultimately,  the model  still points to concerns about
the optimality  of governiment policy with respect to the allocation  of risk.
It also suggests that these programs  do not really provide  default insurance.  Rather,  as
long as the insurer has full recourse to the borrower's  future income, then the insurance provided
is more  like a guarantee  of timely payments  irom ho useholds to financial institutions  rather  than
default insurance.  With full recourse,  it is the household  rather than the insurer who  at least
nominally  bears the full risk.  In this case the guarantee  offere(d is similar to the guarantees
provided  by Ginnie Mae in the U.S., except  in Ginnie Mae's  case, recourse  is against other
financial  institutions  rather than under-diversified  households.
The second insight  yielded by the comparison  of prices and capital is that the Baltic
countries  follow a more conservative,  and in case of Latvia,  much more conservative  policy,  than
do the other countries.  In fact, according to ihe estirnates  in Table  1, the Latvian  guarantee  can
withstand  more than five times the volatility  of the French program,  and more than thirteen  times
20The Dutch insurer permnits the ratio of insurance  in force to reserves  to be more  than nine times  larger than that  of
the U.S. public  insurer, FHA.  At the same time it charges  insurance  fees that are a fraction  of those charged  by
insurers  elsewhere.  It should be noted,  however,  that  unlike the FHA program,  the Dutch insurance  amortizes  over
20 years.  That is, over time,  an element  of co-insuranxe  is built  into the program.
21 In the next section  we discuss  the effects  that indirect  costs can have on the likelihood  of default.  For instance,
Hendershott  and Turner  (1994)  discuss the important  effects tbaLt  the laws  regarding  recourse  can have on potential
defaulters'  costs and decisions  in Sweden  and the U.  S. In the U.S. insurers  rarely  seek recourse  against  future
household  income,  and in some states,  such as California,  cannot  do so, using  only the house value  as collateral.  In
riany  European  countries,  such as Sweden  and the Netherlands.  lenders,  as a matter  of course,  seek recourse  against
borrowers'  future  earnings.  However,  as mentioned  above,  under  the old Swedish  program,  it does not appear  that
the insurer  sought or was able to realize  full recourse.11
that assumed by the Dutch company.  Of course, due to the combination  of the size and openness
of the latter economies  and their small geographical  size, the risk exposures  of the Baltic
countries  should be considerably  more pronounced  than those of France and the Netherlands.22
So, at least at first glance,  their conservatism  is appropriate.
Disaggregating  Freddie  Mac's  data to look at performance  across U.S. states can also
provide  some perspective  on the reasonableness  of the pricing for smaller countries  with less
geographical  diversification.  The standard deviation  of state house prices in the U.S. was double
the nationwide  level, i.e., 6.6 percent.  If we assume that smaller countries  have similar
experiences  as U.S. states,,  which have populations  ranging from about half a million  to over 30
million  and a median size of slightly less than 5 million, then at this level of volatility  only the
French program  and the proposed  Latvian plan would be financially  viable.  Indeed, if U.S. state
level volatility  experience  is used as a crude estimate of how risky  the environment might be in a
country  like the Netherlands,  then the model indicates that price of the option there would be on
the order of 84 basis points  per year rather than the one time 30 basis point up front fee; a more
than  15 fold increase  in price is needed to become actuarially  sound so that they do not
encourage  Dutch households  to perhaps unwittingly  expose their future earnings to house price
risks.
IV.  Individual  Mortgage  Guarantees  as Options.
In addition to the literature  on viewing government  guarantees  as options there is also an
extensive  literature that views  the household  default decision on a mortgage  in much the same
spirit, albeit in a more complicated  framework  (see among  others, Campbell  and Dietrich  (1983),
Kau, Keenan,  Muller, and Epperson  (1990), and Case and Shiller (1996)).  The options
perspective  on default is an attractive  concept both because  of its disarming  simplicity,  and
because,  in the U.S. at least there is empirical  evidence that household  default decisions  are
consistent  with it.
However, as Deng, Quigley  and Van Order (2000) show, there  are also obvious  concerns
with a theory that posits that families behave  like financial arbitrageurs.  They find more
variation in behavior  across borrowers  than the "ruthless"  option model would suggest,  and
internal research  at Freddie Mac has found great predictability  from borrower  credit history.
Indeed, most studies suggest  that the household  default decision follows  a pattern  of what might
be called "a high transaction  cost" option,  where the costs of default to households  include not
only whether their option is in the money,  but also such important  considerations  as the dollar
and psychic  costs of moving,  the value households  and the legal code assign to attachable  assets,
and importantly,  their future credit rating.23
In sum, considering  how the individual  household decision  affects overall portfolio  risk
exposure  shows that more empirical  content than just  house prices and the value  of outstanding
22  While the Netherlands  is smaller  in size than any of the three Baltic  countries,  it has more than twice  the
combined  population  of the three countries.  Hence,  it's  population  is spread over more  distinct housing  markets.
23 Cunningham  and Hendershott  (1984)  estimate  that in the U.S. these indirect  and often intangible  costs of
exercising  the default option may be worth  as much as  15 to 30 percent  of house value,  and these  costs are
undoubtedly  higher in countries  where lenders  have recourse  to borrowers'  eamings.12
loan balances  is needed to make accurate  estimates  of risk exposure. As shown in Figure  1, the
fact that the individual's  default decision  is so difficult to predict helps explain why lenders
ration mortgages  in the first place. The figure presents  U.S.  default data from Freddie Mac fcr
loans originated  from 1985 through  1995.
F'igure  1
Default Probability vs. House--Price Appretciation
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Consider  the light colored  diamond  points. Each  of these points  represents  the default
experience  for 30-year,  fixed-rate  loans with 79 to 81 percent  loan-to-value  ratios  originatedl in a
particular  year  in a particular  state.  The horizontal  axis depicts  cumulative  house price  growth in
the state for the first five years after loan origination,  and the vertical  axis shows the percent  of
the loans that defaulted.  For instance,  the point labeled  "CA  1990" shows that for the loans
originated  in California  in  1990 subsequent  house price  growth.l  was around minus  15 percent  and
about 13 percent  of the loans defaulted.  The scatter looks  like what the option model  woulcl
predict.  That is, when  a large majority  of the states  bad positive  growth,  the option was seldom
in the money  and default  rates were quite lowv. 24 But, when house prices  fell default  accelerated
sharply.
The dark squares  depict  the same thing for the nation  as  a whole. Thus,  the figure shows
the difficulty  of controlling  default risk, especially  for lenders  in places where house prices  are
apt to fall or where  low down-payments  put equity aLt  risk.  It shows that the "knuckle"  in thbe
default curve-that  is, the point  after which  default  rates fall off-implied  by the figure is not
easy to pin down precisely,  adding  considerable  uncertainty  to the income of the lender.  Absent
good information  or the ability to diversify geographically,  the incentive is for lenders to try to
stay away from the knuckle,  by requiring  large down-payments.  This strategy  shifts the effects of
a price  decline  to the right  in the figure,  so as to remiain in the safer, flatter,  and easier to price
24  Note that the figure uses  only statewide  means.  Even if the rnean is positive  some will have declines  and some of
those declines  will be by enough  to put the option  into the money.13
range of the curve. In short, given the complexity  of determining  how households  will behave,
lenders have  strong incentives  to ration by down payment.
V. Using  the Options Model to Consider  Some Public Policy Issues.
A. The Efficiency  of Mortgage  Insurance  versus Down-payment  Subsidies.
Given the difficulties  in precisely  calculating risk exposure,  as suggested by Figure  1, and
the evidence that mortgage  rationing  is common  even in well-developed  financial systems, there
would  appear to be a public  sector role in bearing  such risks.  Such insurance could be a
relatively  efficient way to address the incomplete  markets  caused by credit rationing.  However,
for many European  countries the relevant question is how does the efficiency of the insurance
approach compare  with the widespread  alternative of providing  subsidies  for the second
mortgages  needed tq fund the large down payments?
The simplest answer to this question is which  approach is more  cost-effective.  That is, if
the risk can be profitably  bome,  the insurance approach would have to be more cost-effective
than are approaches,  such as bausparkassen  savings  subsidy schemes,  which require government
expenditures  to address the same rationing  constraint.25 The evidence  for the U.S. is that this
risk has indeed been borne  at prices that have generated  a growing  and profitable  industry.  In
fact, the prices and capital requirements  for U.S. private insurers  given in columns 3 and 4 in
Table  1 are sufficient  to earn an AA or a better  credit rating for most mortgage insurers,  see
Capone  (2000).  Similarly,  a number  of other analyses indicate  that the fees reported in Table  1
for the U.S. public company, FHA,  are also self-sustaining.26
Thus, where this risk is bome at prices sufficient  to maintain  financial soundness,  default
insurance  is, by definition,  a more efficient  way to provide  financing  for the "top up" loans
needed by many young families. 2 7 Moreover,  even where  an insurer conveys  subsidies, as the
Dutch  and Swedish programs  appear to, they may  still be more efficient than are the interest
subsidy programs.  Models  such as the one presented  here allow the size of the subsidy to be
inferred  and so provide  a way to make such relative  efficiency  comparisons.
25  See Lea and Renaud  (1995)  for a discussion  of the German  and French  systems  and the possible  applicability  of
these subsidized  savings  systems  in transition  economies.
26 After experiencing  a very turbulent  period  in the 1980s, FHA undertook  a broad  review  of its programs,  which
showed  that financial  soundness  required  significant  price increases.  These  increases  were implemented  and over
the  1990s performance  improved  sufficiently  so that the price  increases were  partially rolled back in 2000.  See
Capone  (2000) for a fuller discussion  of FHA's  historical  experience  and the rating of private  insurers  in the U.S.
Private  insurers  in the U.S. and Canada  also experienced  difficulties  during this time period.  For instance,  four
troubled  private  companies  were  bought out by a U.S. company  at this time.
27 Greater  efficiency  would be realized  because  actuarially  priced  insurance  would entail none of the deadweight
losses  implied  by government  subsidies  caused  by providing  in-kind  transfers  that are valued by the beneficiaries  at
less than a cash grant of the amount  of the subsidy.  The transparency  and targeting  of assistance  would also be
improved  with insurance  because,  as shown  by Diamond  (1999), it is difficult to calculate the value of the subsidy
provided  under  many of the savings  subsidy  schemes.  In the case of the guarantee  only those who  were willing  to
pay for it would  make use of it.14
This approach also provides  a broader prospective  on how a default insurance program
fits within a country's  broader  financial sectcr strategy. For instance,  compare  Poland's  housing
finance assistance  strategy with that of some of the countries that have  opted for an insurance
approach. Poland, with a population  of almost 40 mi [lion and with more than 90 cities with
populations  in excess of 50,000,  i.e., a countiy  with considerable  geographic  diversity, has so far
chosen to address mortgage  credit risk concerns throuLgh  the provision  of subsidies  for savings
for second  loans rather than through the use of guararntees. In zontrast, the Baltic countries with
a combined population  less than one fifth of Poland's,  and far fewer separate housing  markets,
have  chosen not only a guarantee  approach but guaranitees that are geographically  concentrated
across the limited number  of real estate markets  wilthn each country. The efficiency  of both
approaches  could be improved,  and, as we discuss next, the options model  approach can give a
sense of how various strategies  can affect the efficiency  of the approaches  used.
B.  Diversification  of Mortgage  Credit Risk: Implications  for Small States and the EU.
Figure  1 shows the importance  of geographical  diversification.  It depicts  the incidence of
default and house price  appreciation  in the U. S. across states and shows that most  of the timae  for
most states defaults  are rare, but every once in a while they  are huge. Huge  enough to generate
bankruptcy  for institutions  with low capital levels. For example,  in Case and Shiller's  (1996)
analysis  of the house price  crash in the Greater Boston  Area, an area with a population  of 3
million,  similar to that of the Baltic countries,  in three  of sixty-four  locations  foreclosure  sales
alone accounted  for 50 percent  of sales, even though total foreclosures  never exceeded  2 percent
of loans.
On the other hand, the dark squares in Figure  1, which  clepict the U.S.'s  national
experience,  are much more  closely bunched within the range of state experience.  The national
rate has not come close to the worst  experience  of the states.  As mentioned  earlier, in the U.S.
the standard deviation  of house prices nationally  has been half that of states, and the range of
state standard deviations  for the latter has been between  2.3 anid  23.7 percent.  These differences
between  national  and state level results  are not too surprising  because  since the Great Depression
there has not been  a period  when average house prices in the 'U.S. nation wide declined,  whereas
such a decline has occurred  periodically  in a number  of different regions  and European
economies.  In short, the gains from geographical  diversification  would appear to be large.
Now  consider recent  policies  in the transition  countries  and the EU in terms  of how they
affect the ability to exploit these  gains.
With  the exception  of Kazakhstan,  all the transition  economies  analyzed  are geographically
small,  and with populations  between  1.4 and 3.7 million.28 The Baltic countries,  for instance,
are smaller than most of the states depicted  in the figure.  Hence, they  can be expected to have  at
least as pronounced  a "scatter"  as is depicted  for individual  slates there.  The obvious way to
28 Housing  privatization  in the transition  countries,  inder  close to giveaway  terms,  has resulted  in homeownership
rates  of 90 percent  in Estonia,  Kazakhstan,  and Lithuiania, and more  than 85 percent  in Slovenia,  which privatized
early and rapidly,  and over 70 percent  in Latvia,  which is novw  completing  its housing  privatization  program.  They
all also have relatively high  GDP growth  rates  and low inflation,  and pri- ately-supplied  mortgage  finance  is now
growing  rapidly15
reduce the "scatter"  and lower risk exposure and capital requirements  for such intermediaries  is
through geographical  diversification,  and there are two ways such diversification  can be attained:
through reinsurance  or the bearing  of credit risks by internationally-diversified  companies.
For these  countries, the model indicates that reinsurance  would  allow the currently
proposed  reserves/fees  to be reduced,  perhaps significantly.  For instance,  if the expected
volatility  of an internationally-diversified  mortgage  insurance portfolio  was similar to that of the
U.S. national rate, the Baltic companies  could significantly  lower their reserves  or prices. 2 9
Consequently,  the results  suggest that as markets  develop,  that in the countries  where public
insurance  companies  now  operate they should be able to cede part of their risks to large
international  reinsurance  companies  at favorable prices.  They should, in short, be able to lower
their risk exposure  as well  as borrower  costs through reinsurance  contracts.30 Thus, in principle,
their imminent  access to the EU should offer them  gains in this direction.
However, in order for the EU countries to be able to offer geographical  diversification
possibilities  to the transition  countries, they must first be able to exploit them.  At present, this
result has not been realized.  In particular,  the model  suggests that for full geographical
diversification  gains to be realized  in EU countries mortgage  insurance prices in some
countries-such  as the Netherlands  and Sweden-will  probably  have to be increased.  It also
suggests that in the other EU countries  which provide  subsidies rather than insurance as a way to
reduce rationing,  such as Germany,  France, and Austria, or cross default guarantees  by other
borrowers,  as in Denmark,  that it will be difficult for private insurers  to compete. 31 Thus, given
the current policies in the EU countries, it is unlikely that private  insurers will to be willing to
exploit the possibilities  potentially  available through EU-wide  geographical  diversification.  They
are, as a result, not likely to be willing to offer geographical  diversification  possibilities  to the
small markets  of the transition  countries.
C. Is Mortgage  Credit  Risk Insurable:  Lessons  from the U.S.  Great Depression.
If mortgage  credit risk is not insurable then the strength  of any insights from options
models  are likely to be exaggerated.  In particular,  some have argued that the collapse  of private
insurers  in the U.S. and Canada  during the Great Depression  suggests that options models are not
likely to be useful. In this view, the correlated  macro risks that can affect the default  experience
are such that reliable  estimates  of loss are impossible  to make.  If so, the risks may not be
29 For example,  the Latvian program's  reserves  and prices  are such that it would be able to withstand  the experience
of any of the U.S.  states except Arkansas,  which  was particularly  hard hit during the savings and loan crisis.  In other
words, unless  there is a financial  crisis in Latvia of a similar scale to that of the U.S.'s  crisis, then based  on this
benchmark  one can expect the Latvian  insurer to have a one in fifty chance  of becoming  insolvent.  However,  to
achieve  this level  of safety requires  the large reserves  now held.
30 However,  whether  they are able to lower borrower  costs depends  on the competitiveness  of the reinsurance
market.  Froot  (1995), for example,  suggests  that the pricing  in a similar market,  that  of catastrophic  risks, is not
competitive.  He shows that reinsurance  premiums  generally  run at considerably  higher  prices than do estirates  of
actuarially  expected  losses.  In one case the price  was more than  six times  the expected  losses.
31 The Danish mortgage  bond  system involves  all individual  borrowers  in the credit risk  for all the other mortgages
that make up a particular  mortgage  bond.  If one borrower  in a bond defaults,  the other borrowers  who happen  to be
pooled  in the same security  are, at the lenders'  discretion,  jointly  liable for repayment.16
insurable.  This result, in turn, suggests  that considerable  cauticn  should be exercised  in
encouraging  a stronger private  sector role in ilhe  industry.
Based on this view, the public presence  in the provisioni of default insurance in so many
countries is easy to understand.  However,  this view also makes it less easy to understand  the
development  and flourishing  of the private mrtortgage  insurance  industry in a number  of courtries,
and its complete privatization  in Australia.  The modlel helps cansider  what light can be shed on
this  question by the Great Depression  experience.
When the information  provided  to the Mlkoreland  Comnmission  (1934), which  analyzed the
industry's  collapse, is considered  within this approach,  it shows that reserves  and fees charged
were well within current industry regulations.  For example,  in terms of Table  1 the figures for
columns  (2) through (6) were: a ratio of 14 to 1 for insurance-in-force  to reserves,  zero charges
in up front fees and a 50 basis point  on-going charge, insurance  covered 20 percent  of loan
amount,  and down payments  of 33 percent were required.  These figures imply that the
companies  followed a relatively prudent  structure, along the lines of those currently  used by U.S.
public  and private mortgage  insurers.
Thus, the collapse  of the entire industry would  appear to suggest that even prudently
structured  companies  could collapse.  The result would seem to confirm the perceptions  about the
uninsurability  of the risk, as well as raise issues as to the credibility  of the rating  agencies  that
argue that private  U.S. insurers  are financially  sound.  However,  the Moreland  Report  also shows
that, unlike  today's  regulations,  the reserves  were held in mortgages  rather than in assets with
uncorrelated  values,  and that reported  earnings included premiums  from non-performing  loans.
In addition,  the report documents  that over-appraisal  of property  values was endemic,  and
dividends  continued to be paid  out as troubles mounted.  In short, from the Moreland
Commission  Report  one can infer regulatory  incompetence  rather than uninsurable  risk was the
cause of the industry's  troubles  in the Great Depression.
Hence,  the experience  from the Great Depression,  cannot, as has been claimed,  be said to
provide  evidence that mortgage  credit  risk is not insurable.  This result, in turn, implies that
mnortgage insurance should not be provided  only as a ward  of the state.  The private  sector hals a
legitimate  role to play.  The result does, however,  provide  evidence  on the importance  of prudent
regulations,  appropriate  pricing,  a sound legal basis  for lending,  and the need  for the enforcement
of those regulations  and laws. Default  insurance is not a subst:itute for a strong  legal and
regulatory  environment,  and even in the most developed  financial  systems private  insurers  need
careful regulation  as the U.S. and Canadian  experiences  in the 1980s suggest.  In short,  it shows
why the kinds of risk analyses implied by options models car indeed be helpful to effective
decision-making.
VI.  Conclusions
To conclude,  although the options pricing  approach to modeling  mortgage  credit risks
does not yield precise estimates  of the prices needed  to compensate  for various risks,  we believe
it can, nevertheless,  be helpful  in a number  of respects.  For instance,  the model predicts  that it is
hard to price credit risk precisely.  But this inability  to price  precisely  is exactly why lenders,  and17
particularly  lenders with geographically-concentrated  portfolios,  are likely to rely on non-market
rationing  devises to avoid the risks  involved. As a result, the approach  provides  an explanation
for why there is an almost ubiquitous  public presence in addressing  this particular market
imperfection.3 2 That is, it is not just  that young families are politically  favored in many
countries, although that may be the case, rather it is that without  such a public  sector intervention
younger  borrowers  would be rationed  out of the market.
More  concretely,  this approach can provide insights,  as well  as some cautionary
perspectives,  on the current structure of a number  of programs.  In particular,  we find that in a
number  of economies  default insurance pricing  and reserve policies do not appear to be
prudently  structured.  That is, the price  structures imply either that regulators  often expect these
programs  to operate in a much safer economic  environment  than seems likely, or, alternatively,
these programs have been  conveying  either large unbudgeted  subsidies  or contingent  liabilities
for either the governnent  or borrowers  who may well be unwittingly  exposed,  as well as under-
diversified.  Such liabilities  have  already been realized  in Sweden,  and the current risk exposure
in the Netherlands,  and even with the restructured  program  in Sweden,  appears to be large.
The options perspective  also helps to show when the provision  of mortgage  default
insurance  can be a cost-effective  tool for addressing  mortgage  rationing.  When correctly
structured,  mortgage  insurance programs  can lead to more complete markets  without the use of
subsidies. As such, they are, by definition,  more efficient than are schemes that rely on subsidies
to address market  incompleteness.  Hence,  prudentally-structured  public  default insurance will be
more cost effective and efficiency-enhancing  than are the frequently used bausparkassen  subsidy
schemes.
Finally, such models  also can provide  some perspective  on the potential  benefits of
geographical  diversification,  as well  as the costs of impediments  to realizing  these gains. This
result may be particularly  important  to the success  of mortgage  default insurance programs  in
small economies  such as the Baltic States,  and could lead to significant  savings  in required
reserves  and premiums.  It is also, however,  of relevance to the EU countries'  inability to exploit
the full advantages  of their now much more geographically  diverse  single currency market.
_2  See footnotes  3 through  6 for a brief discussion  and enumeration  of countries  with various  public  policy responses
to this market  imperfection.18
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Annex  1
Brief  information  on the different  programs  (by coulntry in alphabetical  order)
Canada  - Canada Mortgage  and Housing  Coiporation  (CMHC).  (Insurance  in force to capital
ratio is calculated using  data from CHMC Annual  Report 2000  and premiums  are given by Judy
Saunders,  Senior Manager of International  Housing  F'inance Department  at CHIMC)
Estonia  - Credit and Export  Guarantee  Fund  l(KredEx). KredEx gives guarantees  to banks  for
lending  money to the young families or to young  specialists under  the age 35 to buy homes.  Data
was provided  by Mirja Adler,  Manager  of Housing Division  of KredEx.
France  - Guarantee  Fund for Social Home Ownership  (FGAS).  Olivier Hassler,  Housing
Finance  Specialist  at the World Bank provided information.
Kazakhstan  - The Agency  for Mortgage  Insurance  of Kazakhstan  (AMIK). AMIK is being
designed to support mortgage  loans to moderate  income households.  Data was provided by
David  Luchterhand,  Chef of Party,  the Pragma  Corporation  and is described in Merrill  and
Whitely  (2002).
Latvia  - mortgage  insurance  scheme is being introduced  within the framework  of the World
Bank Housing project  to be administered  by  the Technical  Unit operating  under  supervision  of
the Ministry  of Finance provided  the data.  The proposal  in Latvia is similar to those offered by
private  mortgage  insurers  in Estonia,  Kazakhstan,  and U.S.-i.e.,  the insurer pays a specific top
portion  of the claim.
Lithuania  - Housing  Loans  Insurance  Company.  T'he Company  insures the loans for
construction,  purchase  or reconstruction  of housing  granted by the banks or other credit  unions
registered  in the Republic  of Lithuania,  which have  signed co-operation  agreements  with the
Company.  Data was provided by Andrejus  Trofimovas,  Former Vice President  of Housing  Loans
Insurance  Company  and is available  on their web page. Until  recently, the guarantee  in Lithuania
was similar to that of the public  insurance  companies  in the U.S., Netherlands,  Sweden  and
Canada. However,  it was reorganized  in early 2002  to operate  on a co-insurance  basis.
The Netherlands  - The Foundation  Guarantee Fund  for Homeownership  (FGFH)  is a private
non profit organization  with government's  liquidity guarantee.  It was established  on the basis  of
the previously  operating  municipality  guarantee program  that was also backed by the central
government.  The municipal  prograrm started in 1957 and ended in 1994, when its guarantees
were bought by the FGFH.  Data was provided by  Hans Mersmnann. Deputy-Director  of the
Mortgage  Guarantee Fund  for Homeownership  in the Netherlands.
Slovenia  - the Slovene system is complicated,  involving  indexed  loans which make  the
outstanding  loan  amount  decline  slowly during the early years of the loan and then much more
steeply during the loan's  last few years.  This kind of amortization  schedule  increases  by a
considerable  amount the period during which  risk exposure  is high so that default  is a more
likely option.  We did not estimate  the implied  risk of this pro gram, but as the insurer is pu1blicly-23
owned and it is not clear that the loans have the legal basis of mortgages  it is likely to be among
the riskier programs.
Sweden - The National  Housing  Credit Guarantee Board (BKN), is a national government
agency under the Ministry  of Finance.  BKN administers  government  credit guarantee programs
for housing  development.  Government  credit  guarantees  can be provided  for loans advanced by
financial  institutions  that are operating in Sweden. BKN has at present  two main  stocks of
guarantees,  one for guarantees  registered before  1997 and another  one for guarantees  registered
1997 and later. BKN's  losses for old stock are covered by Government  grants. BKN experienced
huge losses on old stock due to recession,  tax reform  and reduced  government  subsidies.
Guarantees  issued after 1997 must be fully financed  by income  form guarantee  fees. We include
an "old"  and "new" Swedish programs  to reflect the programmatic  changes  introduced  in 1997.
Data was provided by Hans-Ake  Palmgren,  Economist  at BKN.
USA Financial  Institutions-  Home  Mortgage  Lending Institutions.  These terms are those used
to deternine  mortgages  for risk weightings  as described by Quigley and Van Order's  (1991).
USA  Private Insurance - Insurance  in force-to-capital  ratio is the average ratio of mortgage
insurance  industry. The regulatory  ratio is higher, 20 to 1. See Mortgage  Insurance  Companies  of
America  (2001). The premiums  are given by PMI Group, Inc.
USA Public  Insurance- The Mutual  Mortgage  Insurance Fund (MMIF)  is Federal  Housing
Administration's  principle  insurance fund.  See Capone (2000) and Pardo (2001).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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